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The years 2011 and 2012 brought waves of political unrest in North Africa and
across the Arab world. Egypt and Tunisia experienced massive protests that eventually
toppled long-time presidents. An ongoing series of violent protests and political
demonstrations continued until recently in Yemen and Libya, the former leading Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign a power-transfer deal in November 2011 and the
latter evolving into a civil war that defeated and killed the dictator Muammar Gaddafi.
Syria remains unsettled but also drifted from political anger into open revolt. The
uprisings in the past two years spawned a new generation of activists who have
reinvented massive street action as a means of political expression organized and
advanced through social media.
This research examines the use of social media as related to these Arab protests
and civic unrest, testing the widespread belief that the communication revolutions of the
Internet and social media played a large role in the political revolutions sometimes
known as the Arab Spring. The researchers take a two-pronged approach. Initially, we
examine the pre-uprising communication firmament in Egypt, specifically seeking
correlation between heavy Internet use and political dissatisfaction. This will be done
using a secondary analysis of the Egypt portion of the 2008 World Values Survey.
Secondly, we use secondary analysis of the Arab Barometer, first wave 2006-2007,
seeking further confirmation of the association between heavier Internet use and greater
political dissatisfaction.
The goal is not to quantify the roles of Internet and social media use during the
actual uprisings. Instead, the objective is to examine the extent that these communication
tools were known and available to, and frequently used by, those who were politically
aching for change. When conditions arose making political revolt possible, the
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groundwork had been laid for how the Internet and social media became useful, and
perhaps necessary, tools for organizing the revolt.

Literature Review

For thirty years Egypt had been under the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. He
managed to maintain power despite various incidents of popular unrest, such as the
Kefaya of Kifaya (Arabic for “enough”) movement in 2004-5. That uprising strongly
campaigned against corruption and Mubarak’s authoritarian policies. To forestall future
revolts, Mubarak implemented an array of emergency laws leftover from the Arab-Israeli
war. These practices, mixed with an intentional weakening of political opposition,
allowed Mubarak to rule as a quasi-dictator (Bery, 2011).
Mubarak’s biggest problem, though, was Egypt’s deep domestic problems,
ranging from corruption to police brutality. Poverty was another major contributor, as
millions of Egyptians lived on less than $2 a day (Pintak, 2011). These problems
gradually led the public to revolt and to oust him from the presidency (Faris, 2008).
Initially, the Mubarak government, similar to the governments in other Northern
Africa and Middle Eastern countries, strongly promoted Internet use in Egypt to create a
strong information-literate society. This popularization led to increased Internet
communication that openly criticized the regime. Users organized protests online even
before the recent uprisings, and often avoided any repercussions (Hamdy, 2004).
Egyptian bloggers straddled between political activists and online journalists as they
reported stories that were prohibited by mainstream news outlets (Pintak, 2011). Many
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internet-facilitated organizational efforts exposed cases of police corruption, harassment,
and anti-democratic policies (Faris, 2008).
The Internet was used as a tool of the movement against Mubarak. Protestors
employed various tactics: social media organizing, encryption strategies for encoded
messages, sharing online content, and using online maps for tactical purposes (Khamis
and Vaughn, 2011). Generally, social media platforms were, at least initially, a valuable
source of communication and coordination, as protesters in various cities gradually joined
in the revolution.
Political discussions also flourished on Facebook. It had four million users in Egypt
by 2010 (Howard, 2010). The now famous “We are all Khaled Said” page quickly
became a critical arena for organizing and spreading awareness of protests. The memorial
page was created after Khaled Said was beaten to death by Egyptian police officers. Postmortem photos of Said went viral, sparking worldwide outrage (Khamis and Vaughn,
2011). Twitter also engaged followers, especially in bridging Egypt to neighboring
countries. Much of the early news of the protests spread to the outside world through
Facebook and Twitter before reaching traditional news media (Lotan, Graeff, Annanny,
Gaffney, Pearle, and Boyd, 2011). Even after mainstream communication outlets
published a story, many young Arabs were neglecting the stories because they didn’t trust
the content (Pintak, 2011).
The open streams of information and communication raised red flags for Mubarak.
He resorted to his emergency laws and imposed serious repercussions, especially on
traditional media outlets; the government even closed TV channels on grounds of public
order and national security in an attempt to control communication outlets (Pintak, 2011).
The Egyptian government installed software that enabled the state to monitor heavily
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Internet traffic with particular interest in social networks, email, and Skype (Ackerman,
2011). When the police monitoring increased, protesters began avoiding such
applications for political rallying (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Eventually, all Internet
communications were disabled nationwide in order to prevent the protesters' ability to
organize and gather through social media. Those who cooperated with the media, such as
cyber-protestor Wael Ghonem, were arrested and detained. During this time, several
residents reported that cell phone service was down and even landline phone service was
sporadic (Kazamias, 2011). The Internet disappearance would not, however, inhibit the
tens of thousands of Egyptians who protested on the streets of major cities - including
Tahrir Square in Cairo.
Protesters relied heavily on the Internet and social media as communication
technologies. The protests, sit-ins and political demonstrations show the combination of
different social networking platforms were crucial in the manifestation of the rebellions.
They also were critical in supporting and spreading revolutionary events to surrounding
nations (Khamis and Vaughan, 2011).
On February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned from his presidency and handed power
to the armed forces of Egypt who dissolved the Parliament, suspended the Constitution of
Egypt, and promised to dispose the emergency laws (Bly, 2011).
Again, most protesters did generally rely on traditional ways of communicating and
organizing beyond the Internet, especially after the initial protests and when, in this case,
the Internet was shut down (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Even protesters who heavily
relied on the Internet eventually only used technological platforms for private exchanges
of information with trusted friends, for fear of penetration by the regime (Khamis and
Vaughn, 2011).

Social Media as Precursor to Arab Revolt, p. 5
The popular press often has cited social networking as a catalyst for many of the
Arab Spring protests, demonstrations, and riots. However, the actual role of social media
during the Arab Spring has been hotly debated (Youmas and York, 2012). Some
researchers claims social media to be only the tool that ignited the uprisings while others
say it was the main prompt. Kazamias (2011) argues that citizens only used the networks
initially to reach out to other potential rebels, but eventually turned to more traditional
forms of communication. He says information networks like Facebook and Twitter
sparked the uprisings, however, he suggests that older technologies, even word of mouth,
were more important tools. Either way, social media use has demonstrated to the world
its influence; internet-facilitated information allowed the world to connect with the
protestors and in some cases assisted in organizing the protests themselves (Schillinger,
2011). For example, Facebook messages revealed that “group members” were assigned to
inform at least 10 individuals outside of the group about upcoming demonstrations and
events (Kazamias, 2011).
The Spring 2012 edition of Arab Media & Society had four articles addressing the
role of the internet in general, and social media in particular, in the uprisings in Egypt and
Tunisia. Dajani (2012) warned against overstatement of the influence of such media
forms, arguing that scholars and critics were repeating the errors of “magic bullet” media
effects theories tossed around in the 1920s in response to the new media of radio and
film. He declared, “Facebook, the Internet and satellite television could call Egyptians to
the streets, but it could not have sustained a mass movement had it not been for the direct
contact among people.”
Furthermore, Dajani noted, the uprisings should not be jammed into a western
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media frame of yearning for democracy. Instead, he argues, protesters were moved by
frustrated desires for pride, dignity, and opportunity, expressed more in group than in
individual terms. He claims the notion that “what is foreign shines” as the rush to adopt
technology is matched by the unquestioned adoption of some Western values and
explanations.
Hassan (2012) went further, suggesting that the speed of the new technology
gives rise to venting but rarely allows for the slower rhythms of democracy. Social
networks thus give rise to a political vacuum, and something quite different from the
vague “people power” will fill that void.
Egypt is the largest social media market and Saudi Arabia is the third largest,
noted Samin (2012), writing from the relative tranquility of the latter. He contends that
social media serve to accelerate processes already afoot; each society has different
underlying dynamics more relevant to the success or failure of social movements.
The three critiques nicely put forth questions partially answered by a peerreviewed research article in the same edition (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughan, 2012). The
researchers tracked some of the history and factors at play in both Egypt and Syria. They
properly note that Egypt has “a persistent bap between the young online political activists
on the one hand and the broad offline Egyptian population on the other.” Facebook
users, they postulate, can be viewed as small in number, but influential in discourse.
They must be. Internet access remains costly and the Egyptian illiteracy rate exceeds 40
percent, the authors properly recognize.
Syria has used techniques of repression and suppression to make difficult and
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dangerous both online and in-person collaboration for political change, serving as an
example of Samin’s point about underlying dynamics. In addition, while Egypt’s online
community may have had success in motivating large numbers to the cause of Kefaya, it
lost to on-the-ground organized Islamist parties in 2011 parliamentary elections; in
March of the same year those same face-to-face forces won on questions of constitutional
amendments.
Khamis, Gold and Vaughan (2012) quote Gallup in pointing out that only eight
percent of Egyptians got their news from Facebook or Twitter during January and
February of 2011; only 17% had home internet connections. Most, 63 percent, got news
of the protests from Al Jazeera, the satellite delivered TV news operation (see Hellyer,
2012).
The overwhelming use of social media in the Egyptian Revolution likely indicates
the demographics of the people who essentially were powering the Arab Spring. Young
people fueled the revolts of the various Arab countries by using their abilities to navigate
social networking to release the word of uprising to surrounding cities and nations all
over the world. This also may indicate that the protestors shared common dissatisfactions
within their economic, social and especially political standing in their respective
countries. This leads to the following hypotheses:
 H1: There will be a positive relationship in the World Values Survey between
Egyptian social and political dissatisfaction and Internet use.
 H2: There will be a positive relationship among Arab Barometer respondents
between social and political dissatisfaction and Internet use.
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Methods

The following research compares several variables measuring Egyptian social and
political satisfaction and Internet use. The data analyzed are from the 2008 World Values
Survey; wave five of the project and covering the years 2005 to 2008. This wave was
done in 54 countries. The World Values Survey describes itself as “a worldwide network
of studies measuring changing values and their impact on social and political life”
(Inglehart, 2012).
The Egyptian portion of the 2008 World Values Survey sampled households in the
extended roster for the post-enumeration survey of the 2006 Census, covering about 1.8
percent of the total population. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Arabic. To
reduce sampling error, the study selected only 25 households using systematic random
sampling from each of 480 segments (areas in which study was conducted) that was
proportional to the nation’s size according to the 2006 population census. This study was
conducted from March 15, 2008 through April 5, 2008.
Measurement of Egyptian social and political satisfaction and Internet use was
recorded based on responses to the following questions from the 2008 World Values
Survey.
Internet use: dependent variable
 V228: “People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and
the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used
(the Internet) last week or did not use it last week to obtain information (read out
and code one answer).”
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Possible responses: Used last week, Not used last week
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know.
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.
Social and political satisfaction: independent variables
 V10: “Taking all things together, would you say you are?”
Possible responses: Very happy, Quite happy, Not very happy, Not at all happy
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know.
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.
 V22: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10
means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with
your life as a whole?”
Possible responses: 1 Dissatisfied, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Satisfied
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know.
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.
 V138: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a
lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”
“The government (in your nation’s capital)”
Possible responses: A great deal, Quite a lot, Not very much, None at all
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know.
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.
 V162: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10
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means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?
Possible responses: 1 Not at all important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Absolutely important
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know.
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.
Arab Barometer (2012) used face-to-face interviews among citizens over the age of
18. It was done in Arabic, and used a cluster stratification plan similar to World Values
Survey. Arab Barometer was done as follows: Algeria, sample size of 1300, Fall 2006;
Jordan, sample size of 1143, Spring 2006; Lebanon, sample size of 1195, Fall 2007;
Morocco, sample size of 1277, Fall 2006; Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), sample size
of 1270, Spring 2006; Yemen, sample size of 717, Fall 2007.
Internet usage was measured with the question (222q) “How often do you use the
internet. The answering options: Daily of almost daily, at least once a week, at least once
a month, several time a year, or I do not use the internet. The answers were reverse
coded so one equaled Do Not Use, two was several times a year, 3 was at least once a
month, 4 was at least once a week, and 5 was daily or almost daily. This was done to
create an easily understood scale where higher numbers correlated with greater use.
The Arab Barometer scaled question about Internet use then could be used for
regressions against scaled questions on other matters. Those simple regressions were run
against: 13 questions about life satisfaction, interest in politics, and participation in public
life; 16 questions about democracy and various nation states; and 14 about governance
issues.

Findings
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In the World Values Survey 17,642 Egyptian respondents (28.2 percent) reported
using the Internet in the past week while 45,082 (71.8 percent) reported they had not.
Comparison of responses to the dependent variable (V228) tested with the independent
variables (V10, V22, V138, and V162) yielded results that generally supported Hypothesis
One. Contrary to prediction, Egyptians who used the Internet actually reported being
happier than non-users. One suspects that might be a consequence of having the wealth
to acquire such communication resources. Egyptian Internet users compared to nonusers, as predicted, were more dissatisfied overall with their life. Furthermore, Internet
users compared to non-users were more dissatisfied with government. They also valued
democracy more than non-users. All differences were statistically significant at the p
<.0001 level (Table 1).
The simple regressions using the Arab Barometer supported Hypothesis Two. At
highly significant levels (p < .0001) as Internet use increased, so did:
•

regarding the current political situation as bad, and describing it as poor,

•

saying you have a substantial interest in politics,

•

spending time overseas,

•

regarding your town as unsafe, and thinking you were safer 3-5 years ago,

•

rejecting the notion that people should support government decisions even if
one disagrees with those decisions.

At slightly less overwhelming, but still statistically significant (p < .022) levels,
greater Internet use also correlated with describing the current economic situation of
one’s country as poor. These generally dour financial sentiments, however, were societal
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not personal. Heavier Internet use also correlated with rating the economic situation of
your family as good (Table 2).
Heavier Internet use also was associated with greater faith in democracy. Heavy
users were more likely than others to prefer a democratic system, and reject a strong
leader with no parliament model. Heavier users also were more likely than others to see
Japan and the United States as more of a complete democracy, and more likely to see
Saudi Arabia, China, and their own country as drifting toward the dictatorship end of the
spectrum (Table 3).
Governance issues also showed some trends. Heavier users of the Internet were
less likely than others to see government’s role as dealing with deteriorating moral
values. Heavy users tended more than others to describe as good a multiparty
parliamentary system. Heavy users also were more likely to have little to no confidence
in the current Prime Minister and Parliament (Table 4).

Discussion

Egyptian Internet users shared certain social and political dissatisfaction that
exceeded the dissatisfaction of non-users in 2008. Recognizing that more dissatisfied
Egyptians used the Internet at that time is important as it preceded severe political unrest.
Internet-facilitated networks allowed Egyptian rebels to connect with one another to
organize riots and protests. Growing nationwide anger could have been predicted based
on the population who was using the Internet and were already socially and politically
dissatisfied. These rebels took advantage of their access to a platform with opportunities
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to reach out to other potential rebels in mass quantities to gather information and share
ideas. It is no surprise that the violent uprisings and eventual ousting of President Hosni
Mubarak followed the cyber meetings.
There were no questions related to social media use in the 2008 World Values
Survey but it appears reasonable and likely that mere Internet use expanded to include the
use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Skype. The Arab Barometer data also
enhance and clarify these conclusions. One must remember the Internet is a fluid and fast
medium with little care or respect for national boundaries. Throughout the Middle East
and North Africa a politically frustrated group, often middle class and young, found
support, sustenance, and community online. They shared a common language, Arabic,
and a common sense that one need not be satisfied with a long-established but corrupt
and undemocratic order. The outcomes may differ by nation state, but these secondary
analyses clearly show that the online communication environment helped prompt revolt,
even if that revolt later moved to other persons and grew by face-to-face and other
traditional communication.
If their website projections are accurate, both World Values Survey and Arab
Barometer expect to complete a new wave of surveys in late 2012 that should be
available presumably by 2013. The new data should offer even more insights into the
role of social media during the actual revolt period. This work, however, shows that the
communication and political environments were primed and ready when circumstances
unleashed what became known as the Arab Spring.
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Table 1. T-tests, World Values Survey in Egypt. Happiness, Life Satisfaction,
Government Confidence, and Importance of Democracy versus Internet Use
Question

Internet

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

t

p

Happiness

User
Non-User

1.76
1.94

.635
.750

16415
36887

26.7737 <.0001

Life Satisfaction

User
Non-User

7.35
6.71

1.844
2.296

16415
36887

31.4798 <.0001

Govt. Confidence

User
Non-User

2.63
2.48

.833
.941

16415
36887

17.5857 <.0001

Importance Democracy

User
Non-User

8.98
8.70

1.497
1.685

16415
36887

18.3152 <.0001

Table 2. Regression, Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Satisfaction/Interest/Participation
Question
Current political situation (very good to very bad)
Current overall economic condition of your country
State of your country’s economy in 3-5 years
Rate the economic situation of your family today
Impact government policies have on your daily life
How would you describe present political situation
Freeness and Fairness of the Last National Election
How Interested Would You Say You Are in Politics
How Often Follow News about Politics/Govt.
People should support govt. decisions even if disagree
Time Spent Overseas in Past Five Years
City/town safety: unsafe to safe
Safety compared to 3-5 years ago: less, same, more

Beta
.057
.044
-.025
-.178
.025
.083
.066
-.139
.015
.071
.144
-.051
.050

T
4.326
2.295
-1.594
-11.116
1.869
4.665
4.183
-7.098
.783
4.472
11.253
-3.935
3.730

p
.000
.022
.111
.000
.062
.000
.000
.000
.434
.000
.000
.000
.000
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Table 3. Regression, Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Democracy
Question
Iran (1 Complete Dictatorship to 10 Complete Democracy)
Turkey (same scale)
Saudi Arabia (same scale)
Japan (same scale)
United States (same scale)
China (same scale)
Israel (same scale)
Your Country (same scale)
Democracy: Economy Runs Badly
Democracy: Indecisive and Quibbling
Democracy: Not Good at Maintaining Order
Democracy: Better than any other form of government
Political Systems: Democratic System
Political Systems: Strong Leader, No Parliament
Political Systems: Experts rather than government
Political Systems: Mix of Three, One Ruler

Beta
-.007
-.018
-.109
.113
.064
-.072
.029
-.067
.000
-.037
.054
-.038
-.047
.125
.002
.043

T
-.303
-.710
-4.381
4.252
2.379
-2.722
1.118
-2.879
.018
-2.116
3.000
-2.625
-3.222
8.268
.132
2.734

p
.762
.478
.000
.000
.017
.007
.264
.004
.986
.034
.003
.009
.001
.000
.895
.006

Table 4. Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Governance Issues
Question
Good Way Governing: Parliamentary, all parties compete
Parliamentary, only Islamic parties
Strong President and Military, parliament not important
Islamic Law, no parties or elections

Beta
-1.091
.704
1.023
-.693

T
-3.417
1.094
2.241
-1.141

p
.001
.274
.025
.254

Present Government: Managing Economy
Creating Jobs
Narrowing Gap between Rich and Poor
Addressing Educational Needs
Dealing with Deteriorating Moral Values

-.018
-.026
.042
-.026
.080

-.868
-1.185
1.944
-1.156
3.966

.385
.236
.052
.248
.000

Confidence: Prime Minister (1 none to 4 great deal)
Confidence: Courts

-.064
.000

-3.527
.010

.000
.992

Confidence: Parliament
Confidence: Police

-.059
.011

-3.196
.666

.001
.506

Confidence: Political Parties

.022

1.361

.173

